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Limits on State Taxation and Spending:
Implications for the Illinois
Constitutional Convention Referendum
J. FRED GIERTZ*
DAVID L. CHICOINE**

Voters in Illinois will be asked in 1988 if a constitutional convention should be convened to review the state constitution approved in
1970. If a constitutional convention is mandated by the voters, one
issue that seems sure to arise is the possibility of establishing limits
on the taxing and spending activities of state government. In the last
half of the decade of the 1970's and in the early 1980's, eight states
approved some type of state-level limitation measure.' Illinois, however, was not among this group. Recently two additional states
adopted limitation measures, while two other states allowed their
limitations to lapse. There is still considerable interest in some quarters
in using this approach to control the size of state government.
In this paper, the role of state-level taxation and expenditure
limitation measures will be reviewed and analyzed. The constitutional
function of providing fiscal discipline to governments will be addressed
in general terms first. Then, a system will be established to classify
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1. The following states approved general limitations on the maximum amount
of revenue the state could collect: Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska and Washington.
See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, SIGNIFICANT FEATURES
OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 1985-86 EDITION 146-47 (1986) [hereinafter SIGNIFICANT FEATURES].
The following states approved general limitations on the maximum amount the
state may spend or appropriate (usually allowing for an annual percentage increase
in operating expenses): Arizona, California, Colorado, Kansas, Minnesota and New
Jersey. See id.
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the various features of relatively new measures that explicitly limit
the size of state government by restricting tax or spending levels.
Next, the theoretical arguments for and against the use of explicit
limits will be discussed. The experience of other states will then be
reviewed. Finally, implications of possible limitation measures on
Illinois government will be discussed.
I.

CONSTITUTIONS AND FISCAL DISCIPLINE

Constitutions serve the dual role of providing the process for
making decisions and establishing constraints that limit the substantive
outcomes of the decision-making process.2 Limiting the range of
possible outcomes of the fiscal decision-making process can help
provide a stable economic environment that promotes economic growth.
It can limit the impact of rent-seeking activities by participants in the
political system who attempt to use the government's redistributive
powers to further their own interests. It can prevent every issue from
being debated every year. On the negative side, however, these same
stabilizing attributes may unduly limit the range of options in periods
where dramatic change is desired.
Almost every state has a variety of constitutional measures intended to provide fiscal discipline to the governor and legislature as
well as to local governments.' For example, forty-nine states have a
balanced budget requirement 4 and forty-three provide the governor
2. See J. FRED GIERTZ, THE PUBLIC FINANCE ARTICLES OF THE 1970 ILLINOIS
(Illinois Commission on Intergovernmental Cooperation, 1987).
3. See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FISCAL DIS-

CONSTITUTION,

CIPLINE IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM:
STATES 38

(1987) (Table 2).

NATIONAL

REFORM AND THE EXPERIENCE OF THE

4. Id. The only state currently without a balanced budget requirement is
Vermont. While the Vermont governor is required, by statute, to make recommendations on how to alleviate prior deficits, there is no requirement that the governor
submit a balanced budget. Id. at 40-41.
The following states have statutorily balanced budget requirements: Alaska,
Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi,

Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia and Washington. The following states have
constitutional balanced budget requirements (note that 15 of the 20 states with
statutory balanced budget provisions also have some constitutional provision): Alaska,
Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,

Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New

Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Id. at 40 (Table 3).
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with line item veto authority.' More than half the states have constitutional restrictions on debt. 6 For the most part, these are longstanding provisions that have been in place for many decades.
States also constrain the taxing powers and, to a lesser extent,
the spending activities of local governments. Specific property tax rate
limits for individual local governments are in place in thirty-one
states, 7 while twelve states have limits on the combined property tax
rate. 8 Property tax levy limits have been adopted in twenty-one states. 9
In most cases, these limits can be exceeded with voter approval
through the referendum process.' 0
In Illinois, the 1970 Constitution requires that the governor
submit a balanced budget each year and that appropriations by the
General Assembly not exceed the funds expected to be available for
the year." In addition, the governor has both line item and reduction
veto powers on appropriation bills in Illinois.' 2 Unlike most other
states, Illinois places constitutional limits on the level of income tax. 3
Both the individual and corporate income tax must have non-graduated rates and the ratio of the corporate tax rate to the individual tax
5. Those states include: Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Id. at 38 (Table 2).
6. Constitutional debt restrictions are imposed in: Alaska, Alabama, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Id. at 38 (Table 2).
7. Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin
and Wyoming. See SIGNIFICANT FEATURES, supra note 1, at 146-47.
8. Alabama, Alaska, California, Florida, Kentucky, Michigan, Nevada, New
Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Washington and West Virginia. See id.
9. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island and Washington.
See id.
10. Id.
11. ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(a).
12. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 9(d).
13. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
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rate cannot exceed 8:5.14 Accordingly, the corporate rate cannot exceed
the individual rate by more than sixty percent.
The Illinois Constitution also gives state government the power
to place fiscal limits on local governments. 5 Local taxes, like state
taxes, must comply with the constitutional requirements of uniformity
and the prohibition of a graduated income tax. Non-home rule local
governments have access only to taxes authorized by the state since
these governments "have only the power granted them by law.' 16
Home rule units are also subject to limits set by the state. Therefore,
the state can effectively ban certain taxes, such as the income tax,, by
not providing authorizing legislation and can set rate limitations on
other taxes, such as the property tax and local sales taxes, through
legislative initiative.17
These traditional fiscal discipline measures imposed on, or available to, state governments seem to have provided a considerable
degree of stability to both Illinois and to the other states in the union.
States in general have, unlike the federal government, avoided long
term deficits by either controlling spending or by raising taxes to
provide funds for desired activities. This has been true historically
and continues to be true today. Yet these measures seemed to do little
to retard the growth of state governments before the 1980's.
II.

STATE LEVEL LIMITATION MEASURES:

A CLASSIFICATION

As a response to the rapid growth in state and local government
in the post-World War II era, many states considered and some

approved a variety of measures designed to reduce the size, or at least

the rate of growth, of these governments. 8 With the rapid growth of
state governmental spending in the early 1970's, even with many of
the traditional fiscal disciplinary measures in place, many states went
further to adopt more explicit means of limiting the size or the rate
of growth of state and local governments.
14. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 3(a).
15. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(g).
16. ILL. CONST. art VII, § 7.
17. See GIERTZ, supra note 2.
18. For an overview of these measures, see R. BAHL, FINANCING STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE 1980s 184-88 (1984); R. ARONSON & J.HILLEY, FINANCING

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 223-28 (4th ed. 1986). For a more detailed analysis

see Note, Proceeding of a Conference on Taxation and Expenditure Limitation, 2
NAT. TAX J. 32 (June 1979); R. MUSGRAVE, Leviathan Cometh - Or Does He? in
TAX AND EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS (H. Ladd & N. Tideman eds. 1981).
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These explicit state tax and expenditure limitation measures should
be considered part of the broader category of mechanisms designed
to provide fiscal discipline to government decision-makers which range
from very modest constraints that are little more than cosmetic (and
seldom restrict or modify fiscal behavior) to ones that are an important
force in the state budgeting process. After a period of inactivity in
the early 1980's, specific tax and expenditure limitation issues have
again arisen in several states. With the consideration of a constitutional convention, and the possibility of an acceleration in state
spending should there be a major tax increase, state tax and expenditure limitation measures may be the subject of renewed interest in
Illinois.' 9
Such specific measures limit state governments in a variety of
0
ways and they may be either constitutional or statutory in nature.
In choosing what restraints are suitable to limit the public economy,
many states restrict appropriations; either total appropriations, tax
2
revenue appropriations, or general fund appropriations. ' A smaller
number of states restrict revenues; either state tax revenue or total
states limit the governor's general fund approstate revenue. 2 Two
23
requests.
priation
The mechanics of the limitations take one of three forms regardless of whether revenues or appropriations are the base that is
restricted. The first form is a fixed percentage limit (such as seven
percent) on the yearly growth in the base of revenues or appropriations. The second form is a variable limit on the yearly growth
determined by the change in an exogenous factor or factors such as
state personal income, population or inflation. The third form limits
appropriations or revenues to a fixed percentage of state personal
income.
19. State government tax and spending limitation measures addressed in this
paper should not be confused with local limitations on local governments such as
Proposition 13 in California or Proposition 2 1/2 in Massachusetts.
20. Constitutional limits on state government are imposed in: Alaska, Arizona,
California, Hawaii, Michigan, Missouri, Tennessee and Texas. Statutory limits on
state government are imposed in: Colorado, Idaho, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada,
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah and Washington, See SIGNIFICANT
FEATURES, supra note 1, at 146-51 (Tables 91 and 92).
21. Id. at 148-51 (Table 92).
22. Id.
23. Id. Nevada and Rhode Island both have non-binding limitations on the
Governor's appropriation request (Rhode Island) or expenditures (Nevada). Nevada's
formula for growth involves a multiplier formula which incorporates population
change and inflation. Rhode Island's formula limits appropriation requests to 6076
growth. Id.
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Every state has some escape clause to deal with unusual or
emergency situations. In many cases, support from a supermajority
of the legislature is necessary to exceed the limit.2

4

In a few states, a

referendum of voters is needed. 25 However, in several states with weak
restrictions the limits can be amended by a simple majority of the
legislature or they are non-binding to begin with. 6 Several states also
provide for adjustments when states take on new responsibilities, such
as the transfer of activities from the local to the state level, or for
transfers within the state budget from non-general to general fund
sources.27 Several states which limit revenues also have explicit provisions for the use of excess revenues, such as tax relief or the building
up of a "rainy day" fund. 28

Tax and expenditure limitation measures vary greatly from state
to state. It is clear that their design is not a simple matter. The base
of what to limit (appropriations, revenues, taxes, etc.) must be
determined first, and then the appropriate constraint must be chosen.
Too low a limit may cause disruption of state activities, while too
large a limit may tacitly encourage a larger-sized government. The
difficulty lies in choosing a limit that effectively restrains excessive
government while not hampering vital state activities, especially when
the economic environment is rapidly changing.
III.

ESTABLISHING LIMITS: ARGUMENTS PRO AND CON

The debate over the use of limitation measures has been very
heated. The intellectual discussion goes beyond the age-old argument
about whether taxes are too high or whether governments spend
excessive amounts. It goes to the fundamental question of the efficacy
of majority rule decision-making in regard to fiscal matters. Sophisticated arguments favoring limitations suggest that political decisionmakers need to be constrained by a "fiscal constitution" because of
the potential inefficiency of unconstrained majority rule.
24. Id. at 148-51 (Table 92) (Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Michigan,
Missouri, Montana, South Carolina, Utah and Washington).
25. Id. (Alaska and New Jersey).
26. Id. (Colorado, Louisiana, Oregon and Tennessee).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 145, 160-63 (Tables 90 and 97) (Alaska, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Virginia, Washington and Wyoming).
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From a normative standpoint, it can be argued that the primary
role of government is to provide various types of public services2 9
(e.g., national defense, social welfare programs, etc.) that cannot be
adequately provided by the private market. Coercion is necessary to
provide financing for these types of services because of the "freerider" problem. Since citizens can potentially receive the benefits of
public services regardless of whether they contribute to their provision,
it is usually necessary for the government to finance these activities
through compulsory taxes.
Governments have the potential to increase economic efficiency
by exploiting gains from the provision of public services through their
power to raise revenue through coercion. For example, governments
must use their taxing power to provide needed activities such as
national defense, police protection, and public health services. However, the various institutions created for these purposes may also be
used to redistribute resources for reasons based upon the narrow selfinterest of the recipients in a negative sum game. This process, known
as rent-seeking, may result in substantial lobbying costs for those
seeking the transfer as well as those attempting to thwart it.
With majority rule in a representative democracy, the various
participants in the political process face differing incentives that affect
how actively they participate. A relatively small group of rent-seeking
activists may exert more influence on the legislative process than a
passive majority. The potential gains to the small but active group
may be very large on a per-member basis. They may be willing to
spend large amounts of money and time to influence the outcome of
the decision-making process. On the other hand, the larger unorganized majority may lack the cohesion to defend their own interests.
The per-person cost imposed on this large, diffuse group by the small
active group is small, creating limited incentives for the unorganized
majority to mount an effective resistance.
This scenario suggests that legislatures may come to be dominated
by coalitions of small special interest groups, each with its own
spending priorities. Related theories have suggested that government
fiscal behavior can be explained by budget-maximizing bureaucrats,30
or in the most extreme case, as a Leviathan exploiting citizens. 3' These
29. Public goods are defined as goods and services that are not subject to
exclusion (based on price) or rivalry. See generally H. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE ch. 5
(2d ed. 1988).

30. See W.

NISKANEN,

BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

24-

29 (1971).
3-1.

G. BRENNAN & J. BUCHANAN,

TIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION (1980).

THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL FOUNDA-
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theories suggest that there is a strong tendency for unconstrained
democratic governments to grow too large and to respond to special
interests at the expense of more general, diffuse interests.
In summary, the arguments for tax and expenditure limits are
based on the belief that government has become, or is likely to grow,
too large because of failures by decision-making institutions. Somehow, normal political institutions are incapable of accurately reflecting
the preferences of a majority of citizens regarding everyday taxation
and expenditure decisions. The reason for this failure may relate to
the undue power of special interest groups, the use of legislative
techniques such as log-rolling, or the lack of effective voter control
over elected officials and bureaucrats. Without this perceived political
failure, excessive governmental spending and taxation would be avoided
by the normal voting activities of citizens and by the actions of their
elected representatives.
To control fiscal excesses, proponents of tax and expenditure
limits suggest that extraordinary measures need to be put in place to
address the failures of the political system that result in an overly
large government sector. Effective limits would make it more difficult
for special interest groups to increase spending and would place more
pressure on bureaucrats to restrict their activities. Proponents do not
suggest that the limits should be immutable. Like any law or constitutional provision, tax and expenditure limitations can be revised or
amended, although the process of change is purposely made more
difficult than normal legislative decisions. In certain situations, limits
may well prevent a legitimate majority from following their preferred
course of action. This is an expected cost of restraining inefficient
government activities. A desirable by-product may also be a reduction
of wasteful lobbying efforts by groups seeking government favors and
also a reduction in the resources needed to oppose these efforts.
The rejoinder to the arguments in favor of tax and expenditure
limitation propositions focuses on three points.3 2 The first is the
assertion that government is not really too large, is not growing out
of control and is not perverting the will of the legitimate majority.33
If this is true, limitation measures would presumably fall of their own
weight and fail to win approval. Another response deals with the
pragmatic problems associated with designing and implementing such

in

32. See W.
CONTROL OF

33. R.

LIMITATIONS

OATES,

LocAL

Fiscal Limitations: An Assessment of the U.S. Experience

GOVERNMENT

MUSGRAVE,

91-136 (E. Gramlich & B. Ysander eds. 1985).

Leviathan Cometh-or Does He? in

77-120 (H. Ladd & N. Tideman eds. 1981).

TAX AND EXPENDITURE
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constraints. It is suggested that certain types of expenditures are
mandated obligations of state governments or entitlements not under
the state's control. This includes spending on unemployment benefits
and welfare support. For example, a limit might mean that a state
would be prevented from responding to the problems created by an
economic recession. In essence, limits may do their job too well by
severely restricting the range of government activities available to
respond to changing conditions. The negative side effects of this
remedy for excessive government may be more severe than the disease
itself.
Finally, it is suggested that limitation measures are ultimately
ineffective. They may be so weak that they will simply be ignored or
overturned. In addition, constraints will lead to increases in hidden
expenditures, such as off-budget activity, user charges, and increased
borrowing or increased spending by local governments. Proponents
of this view believe that limitation efforts will ultimately be futile, or
even counterproductive, in that they may encourage government to
engage in lower priority activities as well as those outside the scrutiny
34
of the public.
The debate over tax and expenditure limitations is a complicated
one that often mixes normative judgments about the proper role of
government with positive beliefs about the performance of the political
system. Limitation mechanisms are usually proposed by conservative
groups and opposed by liberals. Yet, these conservatives believe that
they are likely to be ultimately ineffective. As yet there is relatively
little evidence about the quantitative effect of these measures in
controlling the size of state government.
IV.

THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER STATES

Between 1976 and 1982, nineteen states passed some type of
limitation measure.3" In two of these states the limitations are no
longer in effect, but two additional states passed measures in 1986
and 1987. It is suggested that these actions were in response to the
rapid growth of state governments after World War II. Table I
presents information on state government activity for selected years
beginning in 1954.36
By almost any measure, state government grew very rapidly until
the mid-1970's. However, the mood of the country began to change
34. Bails, A Critique of the Effectiveness of Tax-Expenditure Limitations, 38
129-38 (1982).
35. SIGNIFICANT FEATURES, supra note 1, at 148-51 (Table 92).
36. See infra Table 1 at p. 813.

PUBLIC CHOICE

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8

and there was a major slowdown in the rate of growth of state
government in the late 1970's. It is unlikely that the limitation
measures caused this slowdown, since it occurred prior to the adoption
of most plans. Instead, it is more likely that the reduction in the
growth rate of state government and the adoption of these limitation
measures were both the result of growing dissatisfaction with the size
of government.
The current status of state limitation measures is summarized in
Table 2.1 7 This listing of limitations for twenty-one states shows the
diversity that exists across adopting states. The jury is still out on
their effectiveness in controlling the size of government. State government grew considerably in the United States from 1979 to 1986.38
Generally, states with limitations in place spend less than other states.
However, both the propensity to pass limitations and the relatively
smaller size of government may reflect tastes in these states for smaller
government. That is, the limitations may not have been important in
reducing the government's size. A preliminary empirical study found
little, if any, impact of limitations on the level of state activity.39
The most dramatic impact of a limitation on state government
took place in California in fiscal year 1987. In that year, because of
the state's expanding economy, tax revenues exceeded the amount
that appropriations were permitted to grow by $1.1 billion. The state
was required to return this amount to taxpayers. At the present time,
proponents of greater educational spending in California are attempting to modify the situation by replacing the growth rate limitation
based on inflation with one based on personal income growth in order
to provide more flexibility.40 Clearly limitation measures can no longer
be dismissed as irrelevant.
V.

TAX AND EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR
ILLINOIS

Even though there is currently little discussion of tax and expenditure limitation measures in Illinois, there has been interest expressed
in the past, and the issue almost certainly would arise in a constitutional convention as one of several issues raised by various singleissue groups.
37. See infra Table 2 at p. 814.

38.

SIGNIFICANT FEATURES,

supra note 1, at 6-11 (Tables 1-3).

39. Abrams and Dougan, The Effects of ConstitutionalRestraints on Govern-

mental Spending, 49 PUBLIC CHOICE 101-116 (1986).

40. See Schaafsma, California Taxpayers Say: 'Thanks, State Spending Limit,'
(Nov./Dec. 1987).

THE FISCAL NEWSLETTER,
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While no state limitations were approved when other states were
considering these measures, Illinois voters did approve, by a wide
margin, a non-binding referendum in 1978 that read: "Shall legislation
be enacted and the Illinois Constitution be amended to impose ceilings
on taxes and spending by the state of Illinois, units of local government and school districts?"' 4
At about this time, a constitutional amendment was proposed
that called for limiting state taxes to eight percent of the state's
personal income and prohibiting local governments from increasing
taxes by more than three percent per year without approval of the
voters in the jurisdiction. The amendment never received legislative
approval, and thus was never placed before the voters. The proposed
amendment was opposed not only by liberals, but also by many
conservatives who believed that the ceiling of eight percent was too
high and might actually encourage more spending. In retrospect, the
limitation on state taxation (had it been approved) would have been
unimportant since state taxes as a percentage of personal income have
generally declined from their mid-1970's levels.
While Illinois is not among the states with these explicit limitations, the state does have several traditional constitutional provisions
promoting fiscal discipline, such as an annually balanced budget
requirement and a line item and reduction veto. In addition, the state
has a constitutional prohibition against graduated income tax rates
and a limit on the corporate tax rate as a percentage of the individual
rate.
The growth of state government in Illinois has paralleled national
trends. This is shown in Table 3.42 Both the absolute and relative size
of state government grew until the mid-to-late 1970's. As a result of
the recessions of the early 1980's, state government actually decreased
in size. Since that time, the level of state activity has again reached
that of the mid-1970's. This suggests that Illinois has been able to
control state government rather well without the benefit of explicit
limitation measures. The combination of the balanced budget requirement along with the unwillingness of the General Assembly members
to raise taxes seems to have effectively limited the growth of state
government in recent years.
Given Illinois' ability to control the size of state government, it
is unlikely that an explicit limitation measure could be crafted that
41. See Chicago Tribune, Nov. 9, 1978, § 1, at 10, col. 6 (the advisory
referendum received 82% support), id. at 13, col. 2 (referendum passed by 4 to I
margin).
42. See infra Table 3 at p. 815.
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would effectively limit state activities without unduly restricting the
state's ability to carry out its traditional governmental functions. This
suggests that any limitation measure that might be approved would
probably be largely cosmetic, giving the appearance of restraint
without actually constraining fiscal behavior.

VI.

CONCLUSION

From this discussion, it seems that limiting state government is
not a high priority issue that would call for a constitutional convention, and if a convention is held, it is an issue that is best left out of
any revised constitutions. The potential problems connected with
limitation measures very likely outweigh the benefits that might result.
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Table I
Levels of State Government Activity
State Activity
(All States)
Own Source Expenditure
as 076 of GNP
Per Capita Expenditure
1982$
Own Source Receipts
as % of GNP
Per Capita Receipts
1982 $
Source:

1954

1964

1974

1979

1986

3.4%

4.3076

6.207o

5.8%

6.207o

$299

$447

$787

$818

$936

3.6%

4.60

6.5076

6.6076 7.3076

$313

$478

$826

$936

Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism, 1987 Edition, ACIR

$1,117

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 8

Table 2
Limitation Measures
Expenditure
and
Tax

State
Alaska

Year Measure
1982 Statutory

Arizona

1978 Constitut.

California

1979 Constitut. Appropriations
from state taxes
1979 Statutory Appropriations
1978 Constitut. Appropriations
1980 Statutory Appropriations
1979 Statutory State tax revenues
1986 Statutory State tax revenues
1978 Constitut. State Revenues
1980 Constitut. State revenues
1981 Statutory Appropriations
1979 Statutory Proposed Approp.
1976 Statutory Appropriations
1987 Statutory Proposed Approp.
1979 Statutory Appropriations
1977 Statutory Proposed Approp.
1980 Constitut. Appropriations
&
1984
1978 Constitut. Appropriations
from state taxes
1978 Constitut. Appropriations
from state taxes
1979 Statutory Appropriations
1979 Statutory State tax revenues

Colorado
Hawaii
Idaho
Louisiana
Mass.
Michigan
Missouri
Montana
Nevada
New Jersey*
New Mexico
Oregon
Rhode Island
So. Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Utah*
Washington

Limitation
Inflation and population
growth rates(g. r.)
Appropriations77o ofstate personal inc.

Base of Limit
Appropriations

from state taxes

Inflation and population
growth rates
70o6 growth rate
Personal income g. r.
5 1/3% of state per. inc.
Base per.% of per.inc.
Wages andsalary g. r.
Base per. 076of per. inc.
Base per. 07oof per. inc.
Personal income g. r.
Inflation and pop. g. r.
Per cap. per.inc. g. r.
Wages and salary g. r.
Personal income g. r.
6076 growth rate
Personalincome g. r.
or 9.501o of pers. inc.
Personal incomeg. r.
Personal income g. r.
850 of pers.inc. g. r.
Personal income g. r.

* Not currently in effect.
Source: Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism, 1986 Edition, ACIR and inquiries
by authors.
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Table
State Government Taxation and Revenue in Illinois
Per Capita State Tax
Revenue in 1987 Dollars
Per Capita Total State
Source Revenues in
1987 Dollars
State Taxes as Percentage
of State Personal Income
Total State Source Revenues
as Percentage of State
Personal Income

1972
$784

1977
$847

1982
$751

1987
$860

$943

$988

$881

$1,112

5.6%

5.6%

5.2%

5.4%

6.8%

6.5%

6.1%

6.8%

Source: Derived from Illinois State Budget, various years and Illinois Bi-Monthly

Data Sheets,various issues.

